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Abstract―In this study the equipment lease contract, where two 
players, the lessor, lease the equipment to the user (lessee), if the 
equipment fails to exceed the tolerance agreed by both players 
during the lease period and needs to be repaired, it is considered 
detrimental to the lessee, because it results in a loss of potential 
revenue will be received from leased equipment. Therefore, the 
total income of the lessor in the lease contract may incur penalty 
costs as a consequence of the lessor for failure to maintain 
maintenance performance. We use Nash's game theory 
formulation to find a win-win solution between players where it 
is an equilibrium point for lessor and lessee. The results of this 
study are, when Lessee decides to maximize profits, which is the 
total potential profit gained by the lessee using leased equipment, 
and the lessor also decides to maximize their profits derived from 
the leased equipment by considering penalty cost as a 
cooperatively determined variable. The selected scenario is the 
percentage of the minimum penalty cost with the maximum level 
of equipment used. 
 
Keywords―Lease Equipment, Maintenance, Penalty Cost, 
Exceed Failure, Game Theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EASING, according to [1], is a contract in which a user 
(lessee) uses the equipment of another person, in this case 
the owner (lessor), with the terms of the lessee and a cost for 
the lessor. To prevent the leased equipment from declining 
performance, an equipment is unreliable, maintenance 
services are indispensable. According to [2], such actions may 
include preventive maintenance (PM) and Corrective 
Maintenance (CM). PM measures are used to control the 
performance degradation of an apparatus that may cause an 
equipment failure to operate. CM action is used to return 
equipment that has decreased performance to reoperate to a 
certain operational status. In determining the optimal 
preventive maintenance strategy, that takes into account all 
costs to minimize the total cost expected to the lessor for 
leasing new equipment. 
Based on several cases that occur in leasing equipment 
company, maintenance treatment to leased equipment is done 
during the rental period and when the equipment is damaged. 
Therefore, the maintenance that occurs in the leasing 
equipment company during the lease period is often in the 
form of equipment repair (CM), not just the preventive 
maintenance (PM) which is performed periodically. This 
creates during the repair period, the equipment can not be used 
by the lessee causing the potential loss of revenue. This event 
will not occur if the equipment does not damage during the 
lease period. 
If equipment repairs in the middle of the lease period are 
inevitable, the imposition of penalty cost, as a consequence 
for the lessor, is inevitable. This may occur because of a non-
optimal CM strategy, that is, due to delays in performing CM 
and because of frequent CM frequencies. [2]. The imposition 
of this penalty cost charge is crucial. Besides it is necessary to 
determine the optimal percentage, it is necessary to consider 
both parties, lessee and lessor, in decision making. CM 
optimization needs to be done in this case both sides 
determine the equilibrium scenario, win-win solution, for both 
parties. Therefore, it is necessary to make a maintenance 
scenario by considering it. This research uses heavy 
equipment leasing object due to high failure characteristic in 
heavy equipment. The high frequency of failure causes CM 
treatment in the middle of the lease period.  
This causes the equipment to stop operating and can not be 
used so that lessees lose in terms of potential revenue loss. 
There is a need for the lessor to provide several maintenance 
measures to avoid repairs and penalties caused by the failure 
of the product [3]. For the equipment failure, the model 
boundary  by point process with function of intensity that 
depend on that usage and age of equipment [4] 
We choose game theory as a scenario selection method 
because game theory is known as an effective tool for solving 
system problems that use interactions between decision 
makers. Decisions made by the players must be rational. In 
other words, game theory approaches are an effective way to 
analyze the strategic behavior of rational decision makers. [5]. 
The study of lease equipment with game theory approach by 
[6] are set a comparison of total profits to establish conditions 
under which non-cooperative rents perform poorly and thus 
lessees and lessors can earn significantly more profits by 
switching to cooperatives. It should be emphasized that the 
application of cooperative solutions is a win-win solution and 
provides flexibility in allocating additional benefits through 
coordination. In this case the cooperative game-theory 
solution requires the main criteria, that is, cooperation must 
lead to a win-win solution situation for the lessee and the 
lessor [7]. 
This study addresses the circumstances that occur when the 
equipment leased by the lessee suffers damage beyond the 
maintenance period so that the equipment requires corrective 
maintenance to restore the condition of the equipment to be 
ready for reuse. To overcome the losses suffered by the lessee 
in the form of loss of potential revenue due to the leased 
equipment can not be used, the lessor is obligated to pay 
penalty cost for any corrective maintenance occurring. This 
paper aims to build a mathematical model of a lease 
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equipment model based on penalty cost on each corrective 
maintenance. So it can know the equilibrium maintenance 
scenario for the lessor and lessee in the lease equipment by 
considering penalties imposed on the lessor based on 
cooperative game theory. This paper is organized as follows. 
The mathematical formulations for equipment failure 
intensity, maintenance costs, revenue, residual value, in the 
section 2, as well as the lessee’s and the lessor’s payoff 
functions. Section 3 presents numerical examples to illustrate 
the cooperative scheme based penalty cost and to investigate 
their performance on result and discussion by the paper 
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL / METHOD 
A. Payoff lessee 
On the lessee, the function of the objective to be achieved is 
maximization of total potential profit obtained by the lessee 









� − 𝛼𝛼0𝑟𝑟2𝐾𝐾 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛=1  
      (1) 
Specifically, the total profit of the lessee is 𝛱𝛱1(𝐾𝐾) that means 
that the total profit the lessee on the first payoff is determined 
by the length of the rental period (K). It is affected that the 
payoff based on usage rate, lease period, number of PM, the 
degree of each PM. Payoff is calculated taking into account 
the revenue generated by the equipment and the total price 
paid for the rent also sum of penalty cost paid to lesson. 
Payoff lessor 
On the lessor, to achieve the objective function is the 
maksimasi profit obtained through charges that the lessee pay 
to rent the equipment minus with cost of PM, cost of 
depreciation expenses, and equipment with the following 
formulation: 
𝑌𝑌 (𝑟𝑟,𝐾𝐾,𝑁𝑁, 𝛿𝛿 ) − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) −  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆                                     
     (2) 
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝛱𝛱2(𝑁𝑁, 𝛿𝛿) = 𝛼𝛼0𝑟𝑟2𝐾𝐾 − �𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 + 𝛿𝛿𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟
(1−𝛿𝛿)
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� − �(𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 +
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛) 𝐾𝐾² (𝜃𝜃₁𝑟𝑟 + 𝜃𝜃₂)
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2(𝛿𝛿+1)
� −  �𝐾𝐾² (𝜃𝜃₃𝑟𝑟² + 𝜃𝜃₄) (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿+1)²
(𝛿𝛿+1)²
� 
Payoff the lessor is determined by the large amount of 
treatment PM (N) and the magnitude of the degree of 
maintenance during the period of lease (δ). This second payoff 
influenced based on usage rate, lease period, number of PM, 
PM of each degree and the penalty cost. 
The following is list of notations which are used in the model. 
𝑌𝑌 (𝑟𝑟,𝐾𝐾,𝑁𝑁, 𝛿𝛿 ) = Total revenue based usage rate, lease 
period, number of PM, degree of each PM 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  = Total cost of PM  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = Total cost of CM 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = residual value 
𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚 = potential revenue  
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 = Maximum usage rate 
r = Usage rate 
K  = Lease Period 
L = Life cycle equipment 
𝛿𝛿 = degree maintenance of each PM 
𝑁𝑁 = Number of PM 
𝑀𝑀 = Fixed cost of each PM 
𝑏𝑏 = Variable cost of each PM 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 = Cost of each CM 
𝜃𝜃₁ = koefisien usage 1 
𝜃𝜃₂ = koefisien usage 2 
𝜃𝜃₃ = koefisien usage 3 
𝜃𝜃₄ = koefisien usage 4 
𝛷𝛷2 = Total penalty cost tipe-2  
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛  = penalty cost of each CM 𝑁𝑁(𝑡𝑡) > 0 (penalti type 2) 
𝐶𝐶 = number of failure 
III. FINDINGS / RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
In this study we used a case study of a heavy equipment 
leasing, Company X. when this company rents heavy 
equipment to company Y, a damage occurs during the lease 
period. Based on leasing contract, the company X should be 
penalized by paying a penalty cost which calculate by labor 
cost of maintenance. The createria of lease contract are below.  
The initial value of the vehicle is s 𝑉𝑉0= Rp. 200.000.000. Its 
life cycle is L = 10 years, and the maximum usage rate of the 
vehicle is 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚= 20.000 km/ year. If the lessee leases the vehicle 
for one year at the maximum usage rate 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚= 20.000 km/ year, 
he needs to pay the lessor Rp. 28.000.000 α0). The vehicle 
generates up to Rp. 60.000.000 annual revenue u_m= Rp. 
60.000.000/ year) for the lessee, and the salvage value of the 
vehicle is Rp. 20.000.000 after 10 years of usage at the highest 
annual usage rate (𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚). Labor cost of each CM is Rp. 220.000. 
Estimated corrective maintenance happen 1 in every single 
lease period. 
Table 1  
Payoff Lessee and Lessor based Penalty Cost 20% of Labor Cost (all units of currency is Rupiah) 
Max Rev Usage Lease Period Life Cycle Penalti Cost Number of PM Payoff Lessee Payoff Lessor Total Revenue 
36,000,000 12,000 10 10 44,000 9 208,892,000 137,916,000 346,808,000 
40,000,000 14,000 10 10 44,000 10 260,354,000 162,206,000 422,560,000 
44,000,000 16,000 10 10 44,000 11 317,543,000 189,476,000 507,019,000 
48,000,000 18,000 10 10 44,000 11 377,892,000 203,616,000 581,508,000 
60,000,000 20,000 10 10 44,000 13 578,587,000 306,626,000 885,213,000 
 
Table 2  
Payoff Lessee and Lessor based Penalty Cost 40% of Labor Cost (all units of currency is Rupiah) 
Max Rev Usage Lease Period Life Cycle Penalti Cost Number of PM Payoff Lessee Payoff Lessor Total Revenue 
36,000,000 12,000 10 10 88,000 9 208,936,000 137,872,000 346,808,000 
40,000,000 14,000 10 10 88,000 10 260,398,000 162,162,000 422,560,000 
44,000,000 16,000 10 10 88,000 11 317,587,000 189,432,000 507,019,000 
48,000,000 18,000 10 10 88,000 11 377,936,000 203,572,000 581,508,000 
60,000,000 20,000 10 10 88,000 13 578,631,000 306,582,000 885,213,000 
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Figure 1 is the summary result based on numerical 
experiment of leased period. Both are compared, annual 
revenue of 36.000.000 and 60.000.000. After numerical 
experiments by changing the lease period from 1 to 10 years, 
the highest maximum revenue occurs when the lease period 
for 10 years. 
Table 1 is the summary result payoff lessee and lessor after 
giving penalty cost from 20% labor cost of CM compared by 
result payoff  lessee and lessor after giving penalty cost from 
40% labor cost of CM in Table 2. After the addition of 
variable penalty cost of 20% of labor costs when performing 
the CM, generated the maximum profit received by the lessee 
and lessor occurs when the usage rate is 20,000 and the 
number of PM as 13 is 578,587,000 and 306,626,000. If 
penalty cost of 40% of labor costs when performing the CM, 
the maximum profit received by the lessee and lessor occurs 
when the usage rate is 20,000 and the number of PM as 13 is 
increase to 578,631,000 and profit lessor decrease to 
306,582,000. 
IV. CONCLUSSION 
This research produce mathematical model and the design 
of decision making tools for the determination of penalty cost 
that can be added to lessee and lessor payoff formula. It can 
be concluded that the maximum profit that can be received by 
the lessee and lessor while the usage rate and lease period are 
optimum. Optimal maintenance scenarios taking into account 
the existence of a usage rate and penalty charged to the lessor 
based on cooperative game theory. 
The percentage component of the penalty cost is proven to 
be different if the lessee's and lessor's profit are separated, the 
lessee wants a large percentage of penalty cost while the lessor 
wants a small percentage of penalty cost. But is shown to have 
no impact on the total revenue received by the lessee and 
lessor if accumulated using cooperative. a combination of 
scenario S S 1.5 and 2.1. Equilibrium is obtained when the 
player 1st. 
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Figure 1. Relative increase in maximum revenue during 1-10 lease 
period. 
 
 
